Gramscian and Foucaultian approaches to peace: hegemony through biopolitics; authors: Ludwig, Fernando and Blanco, Ramon. of the means of payment, securities, foreign currency, property rights or other movable or against peace, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The author wishes to thank Grzegorz Ekiert, Barry Ickes, Juris Dragūns, change in East Central Europe to be peaceful and orderly, particularly in. QUANTITATIVE TRADING STRATEGIES FOREX TRADING If you use TeamViewer for online -1k-2k-3k. However, the SVE can extract the most easily identified. As your organization find him with bandwidth required for users are. From this perspective, task and even your machine is all our computers. ArcSoft Portrait Plus.
However, the Albanian leaders were politically divided, which did not facilitate a quick conclusion of agreements. The extreme nationalists advocated a creation of a federation or a division into cantons based on the Swiss model. On the other hand, the president of the Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Professor Georgi Efremov suggested that the conflict could be resolved by giving a part of the Albanian ethnic territory to Albania and exchanging the population Stawowy-Kawka, , p.
These proposals were, however, unacceptable to the EU and NATO members, which wanted to prevent further disintegration of the Balkan states ibidem, p. The negotiations lasted until 20 June. The negotiations also regarded the establishment of autonomy in the areas where the Albanian minority dominated. Unfortunately, the sides did not reach an agreement within five days. On 5 July, another truce, interrupted with fighting, was established. On 28 July, in Ohrid, peace talks began between the representatives of Albanians and Macedonians.
They led to the ratification of a temporary peace agreement on 8 August, although fighting stopped only after the official signing of the peace treaty on 13 August Olszewki, , p. The agreement negotiated in Ohrid was ratified by the parliament in Skopje on 13 August Its content stipulated the introduction of amendments to the constitution, which satisfied almost completely the Albanian claims.
However, the Macedonian society treated the compromise as a high treason, although these attitudes subsided with time. Moreover, Albanians became allowed to work in offices, companies, courts, and they were also admitted to the police and army, in order to guarantee their proportional representation Stawowy-Kawka, , p.
The constitutional changes constituted the basis for the establishment of a democratic state Olszewski, , p. Dymarski, , p. During the transformation of the country, in , the Albanian university in Tetovo started its activity. Also, on 8 November , Macedonia held a referendum on the project of the new administrative division of the country, assuming a division into 81 municipalities, out of which 25 were to have Albanian as the official language Stawowy-Kawka, , p.
As far as the Macedonian-Albanian conflict is concerned, it might be assumed that this conflict has been at least alleviated, but a slightest change in the international situation of any of the Balkan states may suffice to aggravate it rapidly. The Ohrid agreement ended the conflict, but the geopolitical competition in Macedonia, which manifested itself, among others, with the conflict of , has also become a barrier for the influence of the Western countries and the Russian Federation.
Such a situation would be supported by the government of Albania, which considers the support for compatriots living outside of the country as a priority of the international policy. Since , the Macedonian authorities have had another problem in the context of the Albanian issue after the declaration of independence by Kosovo. Thus, Macedonia gained another geopolitical rival, who although, compared to other countries in the region, is and will definitely remain the weakest one has a powerful tool that was mentioned above.
This is an important issue, especially in the context of the recent events related to the re-aggravation of the internal situation in Macedonia, regarding the outbreak of violence on the ethnic grounds between Albanians and Macedonians. This situation was connected to a murder of two Albanians by the Macedonian police.
The escalation of the tensions after this incident led to the biggest riots and clashes between Albanians and Macedonians in the last ten years. In Macedonia, this led to a crisis of the multinational state, which given the new geopolitical situation in the region cf. Fearing such development of the situation, the governments of the countries with Albanian minorities try to limit the autonomy of these minorities.
The Western countries have the same goal but ignoring the rights of the Albanian population may lead to conflicts, such as the one in Tetovo in This shows that the ultimate solution to the Macedonian-Albanian conflict requires a lot of good will, mutual understanding and time Stawowy-Kawka, , p. The most far-reaching claims were those presented by Greece.
It did not recognise the existence of the Macedonian state or nation by putting formward a thesis saying about the historical justification of the use of these terms only in relation to the northern Greek province cf. Macedonia…, ; cf. The government in Athens demanded that Macedonians renounce the use of these terms and symbols and requested an official condemnation of the postulates for the unification of the whole Macedonia — the part of the geo- graphical Macedonia populated by Slavs is located within Greek and Bulgar- ian borders.
The Greek government did not deny the existence of the Macedonian nation in Macedonia but denied the existence of the Macedonian minority in Greece, fearing secession of Aegean Macedonia. There is also a likelihood that the relaxation of the policy towards the Macedonian minority will acti- vate the Turkish minority in Greece. The dispute over the name of the former federal Yugoslav republic is one of the remnants of the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although it did not result directly from this fact.
After the announcement of independence by the government of Macedonia in soon after Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina , the government of Greece commenced a buffer policy on the northern border. However, it was soon completely destroyed. An important ad- vantage of the existence of Yugoslavia was the suppression of the Macedoni- an territorial claims to the Greek government. In the constitution of the SFRY of 22 February , the parliament of the SFRY gave the federal republics an extensive autonomy with their own flags, emblems and internal law, which was to be consistent with the law of the Yugoslav Federation Ol- szewski, , p.
Mizerski, , p. The cause was revived after the proclamation of a creation of the in- dependent Republic of Macedonia by the parliament in Skopje. The Greek authorities took this proclamation as the appropriation of the name, which they believed to be related to the territories of northern Greece, that is Greek Macedonia, a part of the ancient Hellas.
Apart from the name, the problem concerned the flag, the emblem and the constitution of the new state. The first two made reference to Alexander the Great, who in fact had little to do with the Slavonic culture. Following a decision of the authorities in Skopje, Greece closed the consulate in the capital of Macedonia and im- plemented economic sanctions.
The historical and geopolitical dispute between Skopje and Athens was conducted with the bloody war in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina in the background. The fear of spreading of the conflict effectively deter- mined the involvement of the United States and European Union, which led to the elaboration of a name to which both countries gave their consent as a compromise: the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia FYROM.
Although the adoption of this name was not synonymous with an improve- ment of the relations between Greece and Macedonia, it allowed the admis- sion of this country to the United Nations Stawowy-Kawka, , p. However, after taking up the reins in Greece by the Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK , the Greek government tightened its stand on the for- eign policy of Macedonia, assuming that exerting strong political pressure would be the best solution which would force the Macedonians to obey and, in consequence, to change the name of the state for the one acceptable by Greece.
On 16 February , it announced an economic blockade of Macedonia and broke diplomatic relations with it, which met with a strong reaction of the European Commission eadem, , p. Olszewski, p. Considering the ongoing war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European countries and the United States began to perceive Greece as the next country, after Serbia, which destabilised the political situation in the Western Balkans.
The pressure of the Western countries led to signing a Greco- Macedonian Interim Accord in New York on 13 September and both sides were bound by the agreement for seven years. In accordance with the New York agree- ment, Greece recognised Macedonia and the government in Skopje changed the controversial to Athens wording of article 49 of the consitution. Further- more, on 5 October , the Macedonian parliament passed a bill to change the flag and the emblem, removing the Vergina Sun as the national emblem, and in response, the Greek authorities lifted the economic blockade of Mace- donia.
In January , both countries resumed their diplomatic relations at the level of consulates, and on 27 February , the embassies in Skopje and Athens have been re-opened ibidem, p. Despite the signed agreement, Greece has still not officially recog- nised the name of the republic nor the existence of the Macedonian nation, which, at the beginning of the 21st century, did not result in solving the con- flict.
Greece still believes that the use of this name by the Macedonian government is a sign of its territorial claims to the northern province of Greece, the motherland of Alexander the Great. The conflict was also revived in , when the Macedonian authorities gave the name of Alexander the Great to Petrovec airport in Skopje. What is worse, in the late s, there was a revival of nationalist ideas in Mace- donia and its foundation is, to a large extent, the language.
Meanwhile, in the slavophone Greece as Aegean Macedonia is re- ferred to in Greece , only the Greek language could be used in public life. The Serbian authorities brutally serbianised Macedonians, too. Bulgaria did not officially deny the existance of the Macedonian language but on condition that it would be recognised as a dialect of Bulgarian by the Mace- donian elites.
Under international pressure, Macedonia has changed its flag, name of the state and the preamble to the Constitution. Relatively recently, Bulgaria agreed to treat Macedonia as equal in mutual relations. Some countries use the name «Republic of Macedonia». I think the fever around us is falling. However, the attitude of Athens towards the name of Macedonia remained unchanged, which also influenced the accession of Macedonia to the struc- tures of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Using the power of veto, the Greek government blocked then the possibility of accession of Macedonia to NATO, at the same time threatening to do the same if Macedonia opens accession negotiations with the European Union. Fearing to lose the right wing electorate, Prime Minister Gruevski did not agree to change the name of the country since the government be- lieved that as a result of the change, Macedonians would lose their national identity.
But it was a false belief, because it was the lack of agreement with Greece what could threaten their identity. The Macedonian identity is not threatened in the case of a change of the state name, for example, to Northern Macedonia, which is consistent with the historical and geographical realities of this territory. It is proved by, for instance, the reviving tensions in this multinational state. Although the attitude of Europe, including Greece itself, seems to be unfair, the moderate Macedonian politicians start to realise the need to resolve the dispute with Greece as soon as possible, for the sake of the integrity of state borders and the national security.
However, the key question was whether these actions resulted from efforts to make real changes in the mutual relations or only to address the issue of membership at the Chicago NATO summit on 21 and 22 May The first conciliatory gestures from Macedonians reached Athens during the visit of Teuta Arifi, the Vice Prime Minister responsible for European Integration, who on 25 January initiated a meeting in the capital of Greece with the Vice Prime Minister of Greece, Theodoros Pan- galos, known for his more liberal attitude towards the northern neighbour than that represented by most Greeks.
During her visit, Teuta Arifi presented the progress in the implementation of the reforms by the Macedonian gov- ernment, which were to bring Macedonia closer to meeting the EU criteria for membership. She also handed him a letter from the Prime Minister Gruevski addressed to the Prime Minister of Greece, Lucas Papademos, in which the head of the Macedonian government proposed a meeting of the two Prime Ministers.
Papademos positively responded to the proposal. In result, they met on 1 March , on the occasion of the meeting of the European Council in Brussels Analiza…, Although during the meeting of the Prime Ministers of Macedonia and Greece there was no official change in the stands of either side and no pro- posal of a new round of negotiations was made, it does not mean that they did not talk about the previously presented proposals.
However, in the diplomatic backstage, it was said that during the Gruevski-Papademos meeting, the Macedonian Prime Minister suggested the adoption of the name of Northern Republic of Macedonia which could be presented at the Chicago summit. It was said that Papadimos had not directly refer to this proposal, as the pre- vious signals coming from Athens commented on it negatively. The President of Macedonia, Gjorge Ivanov positively replied to the invitation of the Greek ambassador in Skopje, Alexandra Papadopoulu and took part in an official meeting.
It should be noted that this was the first visit of the Macedonian head of state in a Greek diplomatic post in Skopje. The official communications of the U. Ambassador to Macedonia, Paul D. In addition, the passive policy of the government in Skopje implemented since discouraged the Member States to support the Macedonian diplomats in seeking the NATO membership to the extent that none of the leading NATO states, including the most Macedonia-friendly and Greece-reluctant Turkey, raised the subject.
They also ex- pressed their general support for the aspirations of the candidate states such as: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Georgia. They also reacted posi- tively to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia and expansion of the partner- ship with Ukraine.
Although there were no breakthrough decisions in this regard, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 21 May, the U. On 22 March , the Macedonian government applied in Brussels for admission to the EU and on 16 December , the decision on granting the status of candidate country was made by the European Council. On 9 April , Macedonia as the first country signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union, which entered into force on 1 April Olszewski, The European Commission recognised the activities of the Macedoni- an authorities.
Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges Greece partici- pated in regional conflicts, too, but the government in Athens has succeeded in improving the country's image in the European forum. However, the pro- tracted dispute, especially the economic disaster of the country combined with rather unclear financial operations, may affect the relations between the two countries.
Conclusions Macedonia, under the name of the Republic of Macedonia, is currently recognised by countries around the world, including the United States, Russia and China. The uncompromising attitude on foreign policy of the government in Athens continues to impede the full integration of Macedonia with NATO and the European Union. Integration process of the Balkan coun- tries into the EU and NATO structures is compliant with the key criteria of the Greek foreign policy, whose aim is to guarantee the security of the country from the north.
By , the Greek authorities had supported the governments of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey on their way to Euro-Atlantic integration, therefore, the attitude of Greece towards Macedonia is surprising, especially in the situation when the internal stability and security of Macedo- nia directly influence the security of Greece. The perception of Macedonians by Greeks is also significant. Greeks often see them espe- cially the population living in so-called Aegean Macedonia as the Greeks speaking a Slavonic language.
A similar attitude to Macedonians is displayed by the Bulgarian authorities by considering the Macedonian language as one of the dialects of Bulgarian. The foreign policy of Greece towards Macedonia is short-sighted, be- cause it is unable to separate politically attainablebenefits from historical events. There is also a need to change the perception of this problem by the Greek politicians who find it quite margin- al, having no impact on the international position of their country.
Finally, as mentioned before, Greece was seen as a country that would get involved in conflicts with its neighbours, which could result in engaging other member states of the EU and NATO. The events related to the global financial crisis of , which almost led to the total bankruptcy of the Greek economy, also affected the dispute with the government in Skopje.
Unclear financial operations carried out by the government in Athens certainly undermined its authority among the EU partners, which further weakens the position of the country. In this context, the conflict with Macedonia can be seen in two ways.
On the one hand, solving it may improve the tarnished image of Greece. On the other hand, taking into account the critical internal situation in the country caused by the crisis, the problem of Macedonia may be pushed to the margins of the government's priorities. Resolving the Greek-Macedonian dispute would bring end to one of the last relics of former Yugoslavia. After reaching the agreement between Croatia and Slovenia in regard to their border dispute, it would be another example of a stabilising role of the EU that it plays in the Balkans.
Under pressure from Greece — despite a positive opinion given for Macedonia in this matter by the Inter- national Court of Justice — Macedonia's candidacy was still blocked. In addi- tion, it should be pointed out that the existence of independent Kosovo and a U. However, this seems unlikely in the current geopolitical situation of the country.
As a consequence of this geopolitical system, Macedonia — along with neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina — remains the second biggest trouble spot in the Balkan region. These factors contribute to Macedonia being con- sidered a country whose fate is completely dependent on the current geopolit- ical situation in the region.
It is also an excellent arena for geopolitical sabotage, which has been widely attempted in the Balkans for decades by various players with their interests in the region and aims to preserve the proportional division of spheres of influence by powers. This division of spheres of influence determines the geopolitical specificity of the Balkans, which for centuries have been proved to be incapable of a broad stabilisation in terms of Western European standards. The examples of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina show that the process of geopolitical stabilisation of the Balkan region, which started in the early s, is slowly coming to an end.
Again, there are stronger entities dominant in the region Serbia, Croatia, Albania and the weaker ones Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro , playing the role of peculiar platforms of geopolitical rivalry in the region. The dominance of the European Union in the foreign policy of neighbouring Serbia, having great potential to interfere in its internal affairs, strongly speaks in favour of Mace- donia.
Progress in the accession process of Serbia can be beneficial to their relationship, bringing them to the level of the recent Macedonian-Bulgarian relations, especially in the period immediately after the accession of Bulgaria to the EU in However, the increase in tensions on the ethnic ground between Mac- edonians and Albanians shows how fragile the basis of the modern Macedo- nian state is.
The internal situation in the country is moving in the direction of the increasingly marked distinctiveness of the two mentioned national groups, which may result in conflicts or political crises in the future. It is also worth noting that the consequences of the protracted Macedonian-Greek dispute over the name of this former Yugoslav republic, even though they seem to be unfavourable mostly for Macedonia, in fact, they affect the entire region of the Western Balkans. Due to the policy of Greece, Macedonia again begins to be perceived by the Member States of the European Union as a troublesome country which destabilises the Western Balkans.
Historical and geographical boarders of Macedonia I. Bilski R. Davies N. Dymarski M. Jackowicz J. Lite- ratura. Koseski A. Minevski B. Mizerski E. Moczulski L. Olszewski P. Parzymies A. Paulin K. Poulton H. Siemieniu P. Skieterska A. Stawowy-Kawka I. Warszawski D. Znamierowska-Rakk E. Sojusznicy czy rywale? Horosz- czak, Grecko-turecki konflikt o Cypr, p. After another six years, on July 1, , the organization was joined by Croatia. Also Turkey is a candidate coun- try.
These changes were made possible due to the transformation of Central European countries after The road of the Balkan countries to the EU has turned out to be longer because of the wars and ethnic tensions on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Only Slovenia escaped them and joined the EU in So far the only country that has started the accession negotiations, pri- or to the Balkan States, is Montenegro.
They are a process of laborious talks between Brussels and the candidate countries. They may take several years, as in case of Croatia almost 6 years and the progress depends primarily on the reforms undertaken by the countries aspiring to the EU. The objective of this discussion is to present the problems and chal- lenges faced by the countries of Central Europe2, and to compare them with the challenges faced by the countries of the Western Balkans, and above all by Macedonia.
It seems that it is possible to find some similarities and draw conclusions from the experiences of other countries. The problems and stabilization of the situation The collapse of communism in the analysed countries of Central Eu- rope began in , first in Poland, where it took the form of the so-called Round Table Talks and the election of June 4.
In September Tadeusz Ma- zowiecki became the first non-communist prime minister in this part of the 1 Due to the fact that some EU Member States do not recognize the independence of Kosovo, a discussion on the possible inclusion of this area within the organization seems to be pointless in the opinion of the author. Also in , the breakup of communism took place in Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, the beginning of changes came in November under the name of the so-called Velvet Revolution.
The political and economic transi- tions followed and were introduced peacefully. The negative factors of the transformation manifested themselves as transient economic problems: inflation, rising unemployment, the need for changes in the industry, and finally reorientation of trade towards Western Europe. In case of Czechoslovakia the problem, but not impinging negatively upon its European aspirations, was the breakup of the country into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
The process was carried out in a peaceful manner — contrary to Yugoslavia — and the two greeted the new year as separate countries. Already before the fall of communism the European Communities es- tablished the relations with Yugoslavia and the countries of Central Europe, limited mainly to economic matters. Brussels decided to pursue a policy of parallelism consisting in negotiating, concurrently, with the Comecon and the Eastern bloc countries.
The following years brought the bilateral agree- ments on cooperation and trade, the first such solution was applied to Hunga- ry September , a year later a similar agreement was signed with Poland. After the fall of communism, the European Community initially pro- vided economic support, but the engagement in providing that support was made conditional on the implementation of democratic changes.
Citizens of the former socialist countries were guaranteed e. The collapse of communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia cre- ated a new geopolitical situation on the continent. Initially it was difficult to predict the consequences of those changes. The only reasonable way to achieve the goal seemed to stabilize the political and economic situation as well as the predictable neighborhood. The reaction of the Communities to disintegration of Yugoslavia was not uniform, and bloodshed could not be prevented.
The fact is that the Union and its members displayed a profound interest in the developments in the Balkans Sela, Shabani, , p. At first, some comments suggested refusing the former Yugoslav republics the right to independence. The words of Jacques Poos, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, who said that Slovenia could not survive as an independent state because it was too small sic!
This indicated ignorance and complete misunderstanding of the Balkan issues. A further activity of the EU took the form of mediation, supporting the U. The states now known as the Western Balkans, with the exception of Albania, experienced to a greater or lesser extent the turmoil of ethnic wars. They were associated with of the ethnic complexity of former Yugoslavia3 Eberhardt, as well as with the declarations of independence of the individual union republics: in Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia decided to make such a move, a year later, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In consequence, on 27 April the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consist- ing only of Serbia and Montenegro was announced Wojnicki, , p. In , Montenegro declared independence, thus completing the disintegra- tion of Yugoslavia.
Therefore, political and economic transformation in both analysed ar- eas began in a quite different manner. The peace in Central Europe stood in contrast with the tensions in the Balkans. The post-Yugoslavian countries, as well as Albania, remaining on the sidelines of the European events, were at a disadvantage in the unofficial race for accession to the Union.
Ethnic conflicts meant that post-Yugoslavian countries could not join the EU as quickly as they would like to. In individual cases the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia established in left a lot to be desired. The political importance of the two regions, in spite of their different size and population, is of utmost significance.
In Montenegro, the statistics did not include the Montenegrin nationality as a separate one at all. Table 1 illustrates the data. Table 1. The area and population of the Western Balkan countries and the Visegrad Group countries — a comparison. It is not to be judged according to purely economic categories, for if they were taken into account Brussels would probably not decide on the enlarge- ment to the east, or much less in the direction of the Balkans.
Possibly, even the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 80s would not occur Tichy, , p. On the other hand, the process of enlargement of — proved to be in reality beneficial also for the EU Member States. After all, we observe a substantial expansion of markets, which, including all countries of —13 enlargement, amount to more than million people about one fifth of the current population of the Union.
Such a potential was not to be despised. In the dialogue with the countries of the Western Balkans the EU re- fers to the above mentioned criteria in its annual reports and assessments. They are in fact considered as an absolute priority in the negotiations, the determinants of a successful transformation. Their unaccomplishment is the obstacle for EU membership. Any kinds of internal political problems, ab- normal functioning of state institutions, improprieties in holding of elections, etc.
The same applies to problems of disrespecting the rights of national minorities. Such objections were raised in case of Macedonia as well as other countries in the region. The countries on the threshold of negotiations, or already negotiating as Montenegro are therefore assessed in the same manner as the members of the Visegrad Group over a dozen years ago.
Pre-accession strategy intended signing of the so-called European agreements providing for an association with the then existing European Communities. They proposed economic cooperation and political dialogue that would lead to accession. Also in this respect the similarity to the Balkans can be indicated. In case of the Balkans, the order of signing of these documents reflected the progress in talks with Brussels.
In , an agreement was signed by Croatia and Macedonia and later by the other countries, the negotiations with regard to Kosovo are ongoing. The order was of no relevance. The Balkan states were also submitting their applications for accession to the EU. Macedonia did so in March At the summit in Copenhagen, in December , the accession ne- gotiations with the Central European countries were concluded.
They lasted for over 4. After the signing of the accession treaties and the accession referenda, the countries became the members of the EU on 1 May The referenda clearly showed that the societies of the countries concerned supported the process of integration with the EU. In Slovakia Referendum on the issue is not mandatory unless required by domestic law , but it is held in accordance with the unwritten rule operating in the countries that join the European Union after the negotiations.
Therefore, they are to be expected also in case of the Balkans it was held in Croatia in Probably also in Macedonia the accession to the EU would get a posi- tive response of voters According to public opinion surveys from the years — the support for such a decision ranged between Potential membership was frequently associated with hopes for economic growth, reduction of unemployment, foreign investments and overall stabili- zation Bozinovski, , p.
After the support for the acces- sion should also be considered very high. Contacts of the EU — the countries aspiring to membership should also be seen in economic terms. Brussels guaranteed its partners financial support. In —13 the analysed countries received as a part of the IPA the support amounting to over 5. The funds are mainly allocated for the support of initiatives relat- ed to cross-border cooperation, regional development, rural development and human resources development.
The EU countries are also major trading partners of Macedonia. Although in both cases the cooperation leading to the EU was not coordinated, they were undoubtedly the examples of an intensified cooperation. This factor is taken into account in the assessment of the Western Bal- kan countries. It plays an important role because of the historical reasons and recent military conflicts. However, it should be noted that the bilateral neighbourly relations are not less important.
It is worth adding that the ability to cooperate with other countries and to create coalitions, also of a regional character, is significant even within the EU itself. The cooperation of Benelux and the Nordic countries has been discernible for a long time. From a practical point of view it matters a lot during the voting processes in the EU Council. Time will tell whether the Visegrad countries or the Balkan countries will seize similar opportunities creating just this type of "blocs" in the region.
The increase of GDP is noticeable, it is the most evident in case of Poland and Slovakia, the least when it comes to Hungary. Proposals for Macedonia The Republic of Macedonia is an excellent exemplification of the post-Yugoslavian state with the aspirations to the EU.
The European integra- tion from the very beginning of the independence, proclaimed in , has been one of the main foreign policy objectives of Skopje. Its way to the EU has not been finalized so far. In March , the government in Skopje submitted an application for membership in the Union. In December the State was granted the status of a candidate country, which was the expression of recognition of the progress made and the encouragement to undertake further steps towards accession Mirchev, , p.
Since the 90s the biggest problem unsolved to this day has been the refusal of Greece to recognize the name "the Republic of Macedonia". Greece does not agree to start negotiations with the state of this name, which, from an objective point of view, should be considered an unconstructive and selfish stance.
The situation seems to be a deadlock and the EU institutions have done very little to persuade Greece to change its attitude. A research should not be based on speculations, nevertheless it can be assumed that if it were not for the controversy over the name of the country perhaps Macedonia would be already a member of the Union.
After all, over 8 years have passed since granting of candidate status. They have not been opened so far as of 1 Febru- ary The most recent assessment of progress and situation of Macedonia made by the European Commission took place in October Communi- cation from…, , p. The im- portance of an immediate solution of the name issue was stressed. In the report the European Commission also drew attention to the aris- ing problems. Among the successes of the Macedonian reforms one can count introducing most of the reforms in the judiciary, good relations with the neighbours and playing an active role in regional relations, as well as a high level of adjustment to the EU legisla- tion in areas such as movement of capital, postal services and company law.
The adjustment in terms of both political and economic criteria have been assessed as at least satisfactory. These are mostly the activities that can and should be undertaken in terms of internal policy of the country. However, the government in Skop- je does not have an influence on all of them, because international problems should also be taken into consideration. The dispute with Athens in which the EU institutions need to engage in order to achieve a reasonable compromise can again serve as an example.
However, these are undoubtedly conditions sine qua non without which the membership in the Union will not be possi- ble. Inevitably, the integration with the EU still remains a challenge for the authorities of the Republic.
Similarly, this applies to other Western Balkan countries. In economic terms, this area lags behind Central Europe. During one year it recorded a decrease of 22 positions. In it was still on the 42 position. In it was These factors are interrelated and it is extremely difficult to point out which ones prevail. Not without significance is the impact of the international, political and economic situation.
The international situation favoured the accession of the Visegrad Group. It was taking place in the period of economic growth and general prosperity of Europe. This period has not been made use of by the Balkan countries affected by ethnic conflicts often dictated by ambition. Only Croatia in succeed- ed, so far, in joining the organization. Other countries have been left behind. The delay is due not always to non-compliance with the criteria for member- ship but also results from political problems with the neighbours.
Greek- Macedonian dispute about the name of the country shows that problem most emphatically. Today, the situation does not favour the enlargement of the UE. Both economically the prolonged crisis in the euro zone and politically euro- sceptic attitudes in several EU countries the situation is incomparable with that of several years ago. Moreover, the societies of the EU countries seem to be tired with the enlargements of the first decade of this century. Nevertheless, the European Union is undoubtedly the political and economic stabilizer of the situation in many areas of the continent.
Member- ship in the Union creates a solid basis for the development of the countries. In case of Macedonia, given its geopolitical position, it is difficult to indicate any alternative to the accession to the organization. However, there is no answer to the question when it is possible to happen. As in case of Central Europe, which is clearly visible 10 years after the enlargement, in case of the Balkans the enlargement is due to bring success. Bibliography: 20 years of independent Macedonia, , Skopje.
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Mayer, H. Scharrer ed. Baden — Baden. Tichy G. Wojnicki J. The European Union and the Council of Europe are based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, equality and tolerance. Among the natural rights of man's are freedom of speech, of religion, freedom of movement and choice of lifestyle. Despite the good European laws there are still some forms of intolerance and unwillingness to be different. Prejudice and discrimination often take the form of racism against the Roma on our continent.
There are countries where social organizations stand up for the rights of churches, animal rights and quotas for women. In these countries, while Gypsies are subjected to discrimination, becoming the second category of Europeans. What is the most different and what most teasing - is their nomadism. Cases of tensions in recent years in the UK, France and Italy is concerned reluctance to groups camped on the outskirts of large cities in Europe. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia discrimination took on the form of separation and exclusion of Roma from urban public space.
To understand the causes of tensions and conflicts, it is essential to understand the unique culture of the Roma community. Gypsies in Poland The oldest chronicle records of the presence of Gypsies in Poland are from the early fifteenth century. Roma appeared in the Polish cities of southern and south-eastern areas wandering from Moldova by Hungary.
They served for pilgrims suffering for the sins of their ancestors, were expelled from their homeland, so that they could count on the favor of rulers and local communities Mirga, Frost, Their costumes were strengthened European Christians in the belief that repentance is the real reason of wandering Ficowski, which undoubtedly keeping with the religious climate of medieval Europe.
In the sixteenth century, there was a breakthrough, and consolidation of a new philosophy, which treats the work as a duty. Roma came to be regarded as idle and unproductive bums. It was therefore action against him, for example by sending them to overseas colonies first it did Portugal in and convicting the galleys and other forced labor. In , the Polish parliament Sejm adopted the first constitution of the exile, and in the Court of Lithuanian Act announced by excluding persons which were nomadic lifestyle.
Wishing Roma strongly subordinate authorities attempted to accomplish this is through the appointment of the official leaders of the Roma community called "king" In , based on the Constitution of May 3, issued the law on Gypsies in Poland, "which defended worry for village people under the name of Gypsies living in our country". Only at the end of independence ceased to apply cruel law, which required expel Gypsies from the country forbade give them welcome and taken to their farms under threat of severe penalties Mirga, Frost, In the next century the situation changed completely.
There were partitions of the country and a sovereign Poland ceased to exist. In some areas, the few remaining settlements Polish Gypsies and some of them emigrated from the Polish lands in the Balkans. In has been written about the fact that Gypsies less frequently seen in Poland. It's been barely a couple of years and started a huge influx of Gypsies in Central Europe from the Balkans. It was the largest Gypsy migration in Europe since their first appearance in the fifteenth century Mirga, Frost, Came the years of immigration Kalderash and Lovari.
These two great gypsy strains within a few years reach all European countries and even outside the Old Continent. Polish lands again swarmed with multi-colored caravans. Roma nomadism Nomadism is defined as unsettled lifestyle involving continuous change of residence, the typical hunter-gatherer and pastoral peoples. It was once one of the basic forms of existence, now increasingly rare, preserved only by some tribes of the steppes of Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Roma people Borek, Gypsies as nomads for centuries did not have their own territory.
Although for centuries lived in Europe among national societies to this day do not show any tendency on state. This is why their relationship with the land has a completely different character than the populations among whom they live. Roma symbolic and emotional value of the territory did not exist, guided by the rather more pragmatic reasons.
Over time, the image of Roma deteriorated. Due to its otherness, the Roma were excluded from the modern societies, and became the object of discrimination. European societies have developed distinct cultural boundary between sedentary "your" and wandering "freaks". Roma nomadism was largely economic in nature and consisted in providing a variety of services service nomadism. Roma were tied to a particular territory rather by human and natural resources water sources, climate, etc.
These factors strongly shaped the mentality of the Roma, who officially never courted any territory. Repeatedly declared by the Gypsy leaders desire to create a state basically was just a meaningless slogan verbal official speeches. The latter called for the creation Romis- tanu in Abyssinia, boosted by Mussolini. The official international organization representing Gypsies on the global scene has been around for over 30 years.
Initiative supporters of gypsy culture emerged the world's first Board of Directors, announced the text of the national anthem and offi- cial described the colors of the Gypsy nation. Since its inception, the board operates in dispersed, with no fixed abode.
The effectiveness of the organiza- tion depends on the activity of successive presidents. In contrast, the repre- sentation of Gypsies to the government is involving local organizations whose meaning is different in different countries. The most active leaders of the Gypsy manages to gain representation in major international organiza- tions Fraser, The most important is the presence of a permanent representation in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe.
Gradually realizes one of the resolutions Romani Union, referring to UN member states to grant recognition to the Gypsies for the nation. Al- ready in , officially granted a right of Gypsies in Yugoslavia, by entering into the official language and the concept of statistical indicators Rom, as a representative of the Roma people. The same happened in the former Czechoslovakia.
Nomadism was the feature that most distin- guished of Roma from the environment and arguing with the idea of omnipotent control apparatus of the socialist state. Then introduced a number of administrative and criminal legislation, which the Roma were not able to observe. For example, forbidden to ride a horse cart without a license, illegal meetings, etc.
They began tracking the Gypsy camps, which meant that each year fewer and fewer families migrated to the movement. In , the police registered only thirty-four families who have not surrendered to the action settlement. Probably the most nomadic Roma went abroad. At the end of the communist system in Poland, the remains of no- madism appeared in the form of suburban camps - was a kind of camping.
During this time, the Gypsies dutifully report without delay with a local village elder, so do not create significant problems of administrative nature. Culture, traditions, language Roma communities are characterized by their own culture and differ- ent from the Polish culture. Roma speak Romani, like Sanskrit has its roots in the Indo-Aryan languages. The development of Romani language followed during the hundreds of years of wandering Roma, resulting in a strong dialec- tal diversity Bartosz, It should be noted that the Roma culture is a specific, oral culture, which did not develop a codified written language.
Hence today's problems with transcription of spoken language. Problems with the systematization of Romani deepen internal strife between groups and Roma communities in Europe and the lack of wider interest in this issue from the social environment.
On the initiative of the Roma philologist Marcel Courtiade adopted design principles of standardization and spelling of Roma named Warsaw alphabet Ficowski, However, after 10 years, the process of introducing this system in force was still in its infancy. Some Roma leaders believe that in the absence of its own territory, national church, formed the elite or common interpretation of the past and origin - unified literary language can be a very important link for living in dispersed Roma.
Awareness of this fact, however, is minuscule among themselves. The problem aggravates the dispute about the same principle of unification Romani language. Its dialects also the variety spoken by Roma in Poland are so diverse that they are the differentiator and a group identifier, which is still more important than broad and abstract for most of the Roma ethnic community. Despite the fact that in the face of external threats, the Roma are able to unite, however, over the centuries there was no form of social organization of an over tribes.
Gypsies belonging to different tribes used a different, often unintelligible to each other tongues, formed a little different culture. It is natural, therefore, that this plane has developed a number of different antagonisms between groups. Each of them is considered to be the real Roma and looks at other groups with a certain amount of criticism and even contempt.
Romani identity is so very complex shapes not only in opposition to the non-Roma, but also to other-Roma groups. World "your" and the world "alien" Romany world is divided into the world "your" and alien world. Abroad, actually impassable between them determines romanipen, a collec- tion of unwritten ethical and moral principles recognized by all tribesmen.
It regulates the life of the Roma and defines the fundamental values and ethical standards of the Roma Gerlich, Romanipen sets the boundaries of ethnicity and is interpreted by the Roma tradition. This code defines the behavior and norms within the Roma community. Obligated to manifest the Roma identity, to use the Romani language, both in their own environment, as well as in dealing with others. Undertakes to show respect for elders, respect considered by the group rites and rituals Ficowski, Importantly, romanipen relates solely to the members of the Roma community.
Romanipen orders for non-threatening all kinds of sanctions, from a loss of respect and contempt, to the exclusion of the Roma community. The Code prohibits reveal the mystery of the gypsy, nor lie in family circles. In contrast, foreign called gadzia, you even have to cheat. For the greatest sin is considered to be violation of an oath, especially within the church. When it comes to penalties, the most severe penalty of death, shall apply to the "stranger" who raped a gypsy woman.
If rape would carry Gypsy outside the caste - will be exclud- ed. In the event that such a transgression allow someone from the family of the victim has to go to court or council of elders kris. An important aspect of Gypsy culture are professions of individual members of the group. They are a source of income to ensure the material well-being and culture-are an important factor. Performed professions greatly influence the formation of the image of the Gypsies - positive or negative among non-Gypsy environment.
Hence the success of the Gypsies professions enjoy giving great freedom, indeterminate time work, diverse professional activities, and numerous social contacts. Men's Gypsies have long been smiths including door to door , coppersmiths bleaching-tin boilers for industry, craft, catering, etc.
The above professions are commonly associated with Gypsies. They are also considered as the best professionals in these areas. Gypsy women in addition to trade and appearances in musical groups were engaged in divi- nation and occasionally begging. Divination learned from India gypsy per- fected in Greece - according to the tradition of the sect of soothsayers called Atzigane. In addition, also undertook other work: various forms of crafts including artistic , masonry, exploration and exploitation of precious miner- als and metals.
In the era of technological progress, many of these profes- sions have been repressed by mass production. The result of the development of civilization is also changing consumer patterns. Gypsy skills and crafts in the postmodern era have become anachronistic. Demand for their services disappears and occurs only in the less developed regions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The spiritual life of the Gypsies is rich, traces of ancient beliefs freely intermingle with the Christian tradition. Religiosity Polish Roma is mainly connected with the Roman Catholic church. However, this does not create a very strong sense of community with all the co followers. Most of the Ro- ma has a moderate relationship to the church.
Their religiosity is rather pri- vate, but also affirmative and joyful, in contrast to the Polish majority. A special place in religious worship is holy Mary, as in the majority of Catholics. Pilgrimage, apart from the religious dimension, are also an opportunity to meet and strengthening intra-group relations. It is important to ask how one can now shape the memory of the Great War.
One of the most basic views here is that, despite thorough examination and unbiased assessment, history is continuously shaped and reinterpreted, and therefore it is susceptible to political interpretation. This, of course, particularly applies to the history of war: the well-known events of a war, the turning points and battlefields, are more than just space for what is accidental and possible. They are more than nodes of individual memories; they turn into events in the culture of remembrance, in which the battle for sovereignty in interpreting events is ignited and memory takes cultural and political shape.
There are a plethora of examples, e. Magdeburg , Leipzig and Sedan , which need not be discussed in great detail here. Is it possible to preserve the essential moment of a site before it becomes a political instrument? This is an interesting twist in modern historiography. The idea to perceive each historical process as spatial, in which history is expressed by means of an endless effort to control space, is of the utmost importance for the present considerations.
It means less political instrumentalization than existential and political reflection. The location-oriented approach may oppose long-lasting deconstruction, the fragmentation of objects, as far as it maintains the mental reproduction of coexistence and allows the retelling of the history of the twentieth century with all its horrors, discontinuities, and fractures.
To perceive a site as a historical moment is nothing less than to establish a reference to a single totality of historical formations and to focus more on spatial aspects of political matters. Let us take a look at one such historical site: the Somme, July Between Noye and the Somme there is a strip of land which grows the most traditional product of the region — sugar beet. Plowing becomes arduous when, on closer inspection, there appear strange objects, i.
Mortars, howitzer grenades, aerial torpedoes and smoke shells have been found on this site up to the present day. The Somme was not the densest battlefield of the Western Front. When compared to other gruesome statistics concerning the use of grenades and the duration of shelling, the Somme did not rank first on the list, but still, for various reasons, the majority of blind shells have been found at the Somme.
The region was an extensive attack front, where as many as twenty divisions could meet and use their resources. Here, endless suffering was mixed with impressive short-term triumphs. On 16 September Great Britain first entered the ruins of the village of Flers in their tanks. Almost everywhere, too, the Germans occupied what commanding heights there were: near Ypres, the Passchendaele and Messines ridges; in the coalfields, most of the slag-heaps and, until they were destroyed, the pithead towers.
In this place, as in many others, we experience everyday death, but we also recognize the criteria such as proximity and distance. Despite heavy losses incurred by the British troops Flanders became their homeland. Behind the lines the troops often left the trenches and looked around in the villages for a feeling of closeness, a roof to sleep under, a bed of straw, some beer, or even a place to play football.
The farmers of the region learned how to make a profit during the war. One can see this from the peculiar way in which some places were named, e. These terms do not relate to the great battles, but to inconspicuous events occurring in the background of the war. This point of view opens the possibility of commemorating the war in a special way: essential to the orientation of the human world is the inescapable spatial character of experience, the irrevocability, the slope leading to death, the finality of the existential and historical events Rentsch Historical acquisition also includes the aspect of vulnerability, powerlessness, and other criteria, such as responsibility and guilt.
The relationships which orient us in the human world do not fall to pieces, then to create a form of memory, but rather we recognize the primary forms of meaning. We recognize basic historical facts in the finite totality of the existentially structured orientation space.
We can neglect the finite totality of the existential space, conceal it, and keep it from ourselves. However, in this way historical time will never become an objectively defined world history, from which one can distance oneself. There is a basic difference between the unique ability to create meaning for the primary world, the experience that we gain in the world of inter-existentially constituted practice, and the type of experience which is scientifically plausible. Historical experience ends when the existentially political vision of the primary world begins.
The military and technological possibilities penetrate deep into the experience of the common world and thus violate the principles of a singular totality. Therefore, insight into the comprehensive totality of the common life is essential to create historical memory.
If ethical principles are to show themselves in the face of war, they must demand nothing less than a fundamental relationship between fragility and the claim for non-violence. In our shared world we can experience practices in which there is always risk of failure; practices characterized by uncertainty and vulnerability, which constitute meaning.
The meaning which can be created in this context is secured by a negative. It reflects our groundlessness and elusiveness. We can objectify neither a single totality of life as a whole nor individual outstanding events in the history. We are not able to functionalize historical events in a sense that we perceive them as examples of a greater design.
In other words, we can imagine the human experience as neither individually nor politically and instrumentally goal-oriented. The shape of the meaningful life emerges only in fragmentariness, and in the experience of poverty and paucity. Christian Wevelsiep. Studied educational theory, philosophy, and political science.
He finished his Ph. D in special educational theory in Dortmund as well as political sociology in Flensburg, Germany. His main focuses of research are: theory of society, anthropology and ethics, and the history of modern violence.
At the moment he is working on a monograph about the history of the war from basic anthropological view. Fest, Joachim Hitler. Eine Biographie Frankfurt a. Krippendorff, Ernst Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft Frankfurt a. Metz, Karl Heinz Geschichte der Gewalt. Transzendentale Anthropologie und praktische Philosophie Frankfurt a. Waldenfels, Bernard Topographie des Fremden. This article has been published in the second issue of Remembrance and Solidarity Studies dedicated to the European memory of the First World War.
In our perception, however, the events which took place in the autumn of that year are more like the end of an epoch than the beginning of a new era. On July 6, Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Strasbourg to the Council of Europe during which he informed his audience that the Soviet Union would not oppose reforms in Eastern Europe. After such a public declaration from the heart of an empire that it would not, and could not, cling to the peripheral regions of its sphere of influence — an announcement which was greeted with great acclaim all over the world — it was only a matter of time until the proconsuls of the Russian empire in Warsaw, Budapest, East Berlin, Prague und Bucharest fell.
But it remained open as to how and where they would fall. This occurred on precisely the same day as the first semi-free elections were held in Poland. Not least because of the chilling example set by Tiananmen Square, the men and women opposing the communist regimes in Europe in deliberately avoided the use of violence.
During the decades of their rule, the communist regimes had, by threat and force, squandered all their standing. But despite all the weapons these regimes had at their disposal, they unintentionally taught their citizens how ineffectual the use of violence was. In the communist state parties in Central Europe still commanded the necessary weaponry and instruments of power, but they lacked a strong leadership.
Only a leadership which did not shrink from spilling blood could have deployed those means the regimes still had of enforcing their will. An antipathy to violence was the only thing many revolutionaries of had in common commocomm. The revolutionaries were an unusually diverse group. It was not uncommon for reformists to include reform communists, social democrats, liberal intellectuals, nationalists, supporters of a free market economy, church activists, trade unionists, pacifists, a few traditional Trotskyites and many others besides.
This diversity was part of their strength and was poison for the one-party state. The ideological similarities between the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence meant that a threat to or collapse of the communist leadership in one country inevitably weakened the legitimacy of the rest. One characteristic of revolutions appears to be that they erode the legitimacy of the ruling power through cumulative examples.
What was new in was the speed of events. The mass media contributed to the acceleration and the irreversible nature of events. The Hungarians and Czechs, in particular, were able to watch the gradual unfolding of their own revolutions in the news every evening on television. This exalted feeling, the experience of recovering their own dignity, which the Poles had known in and had enthusiastically celebrated, now became comprehensible to and reproducible for Czechs, Slovakians, Hungarians, and in a special fashion for East Germans.
Within days, the communist regimes had lost something they had previously carefully guarded by repeated sanctions: their monopoly on the flow of information. The fear of standing alone which, particularly in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia, made any involvement in oppositional activities an uncertain and nerve-racking undertaking had disappeared for good. However in Poland the changes which took place in have not become a repository of memory which elicits heartfelt joy and deep emotions.
Practicality and negotiating skills were therefore more in demand than revolutionary fervour. Representatives of radical oppositional groups have criticised that the Round Table signified an unacceptable arrangement with the enemy. This criticism is repeated regularly and has been reiterated with even greater vehemence over the past few years. Any description of the year would be incomplete without a look at the reunification of Germany and the impact on ingrained international perceptions and habits.
That year of revolutions strongly challenged those habits and perceptions, a challenge which was far from welcome to many European governments. What had happened? Prior to there was a general consensus in Western Europe that the German question would only arise when the political conditions were there, that is, when there was a European framework for a lasting peace.
The reality looked very different. France and Great Britain were alarmed by the rise of a supposedly unchecked nation with an 80 million-strong population. For the newly elected government of Mazowiecki, German reunification offered the opportunity to cautiously replace the old obligations of the Warsaw Pact with sovereign relationships and new partnerships forged with the West.
The agreement of only held good for the old Federal Republic of Germany, not for a united Germany. What remains is his courage and strategic achievement. Even if politically the order of Yalta which divided Europe after the Second World War into a dictatorial East and a democratic West has now been swept away, the memorial cultures of Eastern and Western Europe continue alongside each other, often even in opposition to each other, as if the impositions of a life lived behind the Iron Curtain had carved themselves even deeper into the memory of Central Europeans than was considered possible in the capital cities of western Europe.
The actions of the Central European men and women in deserve to be included in a European history of freedom where they can serve as an instrumental example of how a civil society can be achieved. It aimed at overcoming borders and demonstrated that, always and everywhere, the dignity and the freedom of individuals are worth asserting and defending.
The year is a European repository of memory because it is what made Europe possible in its present form. Peter Bender, Deutschlands Wiederkehr. Eine ungeteilte Nachkriegsgeschichte —, Stuttgart , p. Vom Fall der Mauer zum Krieg im Irak. In worked as contractual lecturer of contemporary history and politics in Humboldt University. For me regime change, the change of the political system, started with a fair amount of crying. I started to shed tears not because of a mass event in the streets, the declaration of the republic or because of the first free elections.
I was not even eight years old at the time and my father did not let my younger sister and me go swimming. We used to go to swimming lessons with Uncle Tibi, who wore a frightening beard on his face, but he had a rare gift for teaching us youngsters to swim. My father said something like we had to watch history in the making on television. It was 16th June This was the day when Imre Nagy, the prime minister of the Hungarian revolution, who had been sentenced to death in a showcase trial, was reburied along with his fellows in martyrdom.
The crowd was dignified, the Gallery of Art, decked in black and white, was very solemn. Well-known actors were continually reading out the names of workers, students, soldiers, and intellectuals murdered during the repressions in the aftermath of the revolution. During the reburial ceremony he stood confused, deserted even by his own people, fighting with his demons. He lived to see the lie tumble as a house of cards which once served as the foundation of the whole system. Luckily, thanks to our leaders — the official explanation went on — since then we had managed to stand on our two feet and our lives had improved.
Sooner or later a flat was allocated to everyone and having waited for many years we might even be lucky enough to be able to buy a Trabant or Wartburg manufactured in the Democratic Republic of Germany. We could even travel to the West — once in three years — and politics more or less left us in peace.
As long as you did not criticise too loudly you could go on living your own life. This explanation of the world around us that defined the lives of generations was particularly dangerous because it was not entirely false. Compared to the other countries of the Bloc but only to them!
The official propaganda did not hesitate to refer to the allegedly lazy Poles, who had critical shortages of goods during the state of emergency, to the rigid Czechoslovakian system, or to the ever darker conditions in Romania. The Hungarian system was rightly called goulash communism, only the ingredients were rotten. The meat stunk, the vegetables were withered and the potatoes were stale. The dictatorship was founded on fundamental lies: was not a counter-revolution but a revolution, the Soviets were not helping but occupying, and contrary to all the slogans we were not allowed to live free lives, to travel freely, to start a business freely, to pray freely — all the things that for any citizen of the allegedly decadent West were commonplace.
Workers were lying about their work, company directors were lying about the productivity of their companies, and the state was lying just about everything. During the time of regime change there was a moment rarely mentioned, but one that still defined the subsequent years and even decades of Hungary.
He was also forced to confess that the administration was publishing false figures about the debt as early as the middle of the 80s, fearing that they might scare away foreign investors. So, the ideological and economic foundations of the communist system were false. He maintained that one can occasionally lie in politics, but no system can be founded on lies forever. We might add that if one still attempts to do so, one has to pay dearly for a long time for such deception. This is true even if we already know that without the geopolitical constellation the collapse of the dictatorship would not have taken place in Hungary nor elsewhere in the region.
The Soviet Union simply collapsed under the weight of its own internal problems, its economy — except for the military industry — failed to function in almost all areas. It still might have had the strength to intervene in Central Europe, but it no longer had the will to do so. This situation is further worsened by the struggle among the elite that erupted in —, manifesting itself in cultural-symbolic matters, and which stunned the observer by its fierce and, at the same time, hopeless nature.
What is the function of government in the economy? When and how should it intervene? What happened during the process of privatization? What is to happen with the education and the health systems? And in general, what happened to us in the 20th century? In what ways should we remember and think about the Trianon peace resolutions, about World War II, about the Holocaust, about , or about regime change? There are so many controversial issues in which we seem to be even farther from a common ground than we were at the start of the process in — Without trying to bore the reader with Hungarian internal political developments, it is my contention that the governance of Fidesz who was given an unprecedented electoral mandate in since the change of the political system by having gained two thirds of the votes in the parliamentary elections could be described as an attempt to solve this complex heap of Hungarian problems.
This was signalled not only by the forward thrust of the far-right, which by riding the waves of hopelessness and despair gained 17 per cent of the votes. The political credibility of the system of regime change was also eaten away by corruption and incompetence, which essentially ruined the social liberal government in power between and By that time the opposing sides could not even agree on the meaning of words and their strength was enough only to render those in power untrustworthy, but not to have a decisive victory over them.
This only aggravated and intensified a very dangerous feeling, the complete lack of trust on the part of a significant segment of the Hungarian population in all sorts of institutions, specifically in the governments in power. Despite all attempts to prove to the contrary, he was a man of immaculate democratic credentials, and a statesman of European calibre who understood what could poison the public and social relations, as well as the economy of the country that just recently regained its independence.
In Hungary, lack of trust has roots going back farther than communism, but the four decades of dictatorship amplified this phenomenon tremendously. According to the leaders of Fidesz, who regained victory in , which greatly contributed to the prevalence of this lack of trust was that during its first term the freely elected parliament was not able to complete regime change with a symbolic act of jurisdiction, the adoption of a new constitution.
This committee set up a special police force with the aim that in the aftermath of the revolution and war of independence it could function as an organ both securing the peace and assisting in repression, as well as acting against the civilian population.
The units of this police force working under the Provisional Executive Committee, with Biszku among its ranks, opened fire with the aim of deterrence against the unarmed civilian population in several major cities and towns in Hungary, killing children and women alike.
The fact that Biszku was left unharmed and unaccountable for so long also became a symbol of the unsettled nature of the past, which many ascribe to the accounts of the constitutional system. The fact that the new institutional system still remained operational for two decades is largely due to the Constitutional Court.
In , however, the adoption of a new constitution suddenly came within reach, which had been attempted since by all governing forces in one way or another, proving the need for correction. Voting for a new constitution between and — although the necessary parliamentary majority did exist — could never take place due to the disputes between the governing socialists and the liberals. Later, however, the plans could not materialize because of the ever deepening lack of trust among the participants of the Hungarian political scene.
According to the debatable, although strongly supported right—wing evaluation of the situation, the ambivalent nature of the regime change stemmed from the fact that in Hungary the change of the system, the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and the adoption of the new constitution did not go hand in hand.
We need to know all this to be able to understand why Fidesz, obtaining on its own the majority necessary for the creation of a constitution, insisted so much in — on drawing up and adopting a new constitution even though the opposition parties, initially cooperating in the work of the parliamentary committee, finally withdrew from the process.
Moreover, in their rhetoric they clearly equated the adoption of the constitution and, later the constitution itself, with the current political interests of the government and promised to modify it as soon as the opportunity presented itself. Of course, it cannot be excluded that with the passage of time Hungary will also follow the model of the French Fifth Republic.
This is to say that even the current governmental majority, which proclaimed a complete new beginning, did not distance itself from the main directions of the governmental system and the division of power. Its amendments were, primarily, ideological in nature, or can be traced back to the practice of the Constitutional Court during the past two decades: It could also be considered as an attempt to level out the unevenness of the previous constitution.
Still, in case of a political turn to the left, chances are very slim for reasonableness, which can only partially be explained by the politics of power of the right. We are probably talking about something much deeper here. Keeping a distance and reflecting upon ourselves and our environment is probably more important and necessary in Hungarian public life than anywhere else. Public life is ruled on a daily basis by decade-long grievances, unforgivable personal animosities, unfortunate half-sentences uttered 15 years ago that are used as reference points, as well as taboos and excommunications that make rational debates impossible.
Whereas if we allowed for the contrasting of interests, the emergence of a multitude of opinions, heated debates or — God forbid — even a negative campaign that would by no means spell the end of democracy or a national tragedy. Hungarian public life, despite all rumours to the contrary, is no more evil than the French, German — or let us be more modest — the Slovak, Polish or the Romanian one.
My biggest cause for concern is that empathy disappeared from decisive segments of the Hungarian public in relation to different opinions, perspectives, and even narratives. Although our politicians have undoubtedly played their parts in the development of the current situation, only the smaller part of the responsibility can be ascribed to them.
Although it may feel good for many to divide the nation into a corrupt and irresponsible political elite that is busy digging trenches and stirring up hatred on the one hand, and unfortunate, deceived voters and citizens yearning for peace on the other, I believe it is a highly misleading attitude.
The Hungarian political elite are neither better nor worse than the country they come from. If you like, our representatives and party leaders are reflections of our society. They are like Hungarian football, Hungarian gastronomy or the Hungarian traffic culture. Yes, our politicians throw mud, they are petty and egotistical but do we, citizens, workers of the press, push them in the direction of a different kind of attitude?
Despite the continual bashing of politics and the state, in Hungary everyone expects everything from the state: the director making films that nobody cares about as well as the pensioner criticising the local store operated by the local government. Internal conflicts among intellectuals evolve into battles of big politics because the party logo functions as an excellent way of distinguishing between friend and foe, and with a bit of luck, it may also secure us favours, membership on a board of trustees, or may bring us business orders for our enterprise.
This sort of behaviour makes it impossible to conduct constructive debates about the directions of the economy or of foreign policy, as well as about the evaluation of our past. This almost constant phenomenon since the regime change destroys not only the morale of the country, but its competitiveness as well.
In Hungary, the majority of those with strong political preferences perceive taking account of or understanding anything that differs from the line — or the perceived line — of their favourite party as a betrayal. This attitude is obvious if one watches the call-in programmes of any television channel, and listens to the arguments of the callers that are ripe with hatred. Hungarian public life and the Hungarian public per se tend to think in a weird winner—loser frame of mind.
One may accept this way of thinking from a politician, but much less from rational people considering themselves intellectuals. In the first few years following the regime change of —, one million jobs disappeared and a stunningly large number of people typically miners and workers of former state factories representing heavy industries that produced hazardous, but still not competitive products fled to various kinds of social programs.
According to astonishing data, while the number of unemployed in hardly exceeded 20,, in it was almost , Although this number dropped during the following years, one may imagine the tensions created in Hungarian society by the thirty-fold increase in unemployment. Moreover, for a segment of the middle class to stay afloat and not hit rock bottom came to be an everyday experience.
However, with the passage of time, this became a frustrating experience for an increasingly wider section of the society. It was not only their own lives that took an unwelcome turn, they also had to realise that despite all their efforts, their children were also unlikely to fare any better.
This situation inevitably led to major frustration and was coupled by another kind of dissatisfaction that had political consequences. Similarly to other former socialist countries, Hungary also had to face a clear contradiction in — However, because of the change of the economic system, the importance of market automatisms increased, which, in turn, favoured the previous elite in their retention of power.
The political right which formed the first government of the regime change had to face a strange dilemma in to the extent that they insisted on the change of the elite, to the same extent they hampered the economic regime change as well as the expansion of market conditions, and vice versa.
The stronger the power of privatization and market automatisms became, the more likely the economic elite of the previous system was to be successful amidst the new conditions as well. Only a strong middle class could have been able to come to terms with this contradiction and the tensions stemming from it. A middle class, however, evolved only partially due to the reasons described above. This scenario took place not only in the economy but also elsewhere starting from government offices, to trade unions, and security services.
Although it was impossible not to recognise the aspiration for positions in the criticism on the part of the political right, in general, this sort of power-transition still deteriorated the chances for the establishment of democratic pluralism, as well as a real parliamentary rotation system. The social historian, Tibor Valuch, stated that in approximately half a decade following regime change and amid increasingly market-type conditions, the role of education, professional skills and expertise, especially convertible knowledge, came to be more highly appreciated.
The value of symbolic capital such as relationships, creativity, entrepreneurship and adaptability significantly increased during the social position-transfer. Despite all strategies to the contrary, the increase in disparity of income and wealth was constant and of an accelerating rate ever since the beginning of the 90s.
A highly numerous stratum of entrepreneurs, large and small, developed rapidly. In in every 10 Hungarian households there was one entrepreneur. The number of individual and corporate business people exceeded one million, however, every third one was a member of an enterprise that did not carry out any real activities. This means that there was no direct correlation between the entrepreneurial spirit, self-care, risk-taking and competition that was so much desired and the seemingly large number of entrepreneurs.
These processes, taking place in the labour force and the economy, struck the Roma segment of Hungarian society much harder than the general population. Although their partial modernization and integration did take place during socialism, it mostly happened by way of sweeping the problems under the carpet.
The Roma workers of low educational background were absorbed by the Hungarian industry as simple labourers, but no further efforts were made at their real integration and education. It was even considered a taboo to discuss their situation. According to studies, during the period following regime change, approximately 70 per cent of Roma heads of households were poor, and this figure in essence has not changed ever since.
When analysing the process of disillusionment we must mention the following: parallel with the economic changes, in effect — using the jargon of journalism — the big story was gone. The dream, although not worked out in all its details but shared universally, dissipated. But what was it all about?
Among these were many things necessary for the setting up of a market economy, just like a significant part of foreign businesses also contributed to the creation of the new economic system by bringing useful technological expertise and capital to the country.
Other companies, however, without even concealing it, were only interested in buying a market in Hungary and acquired the companies, offered at very reduced prices, but otherwise requiring only minimal investment to make them competitive for example in the food industry, which was profitable even during the dictatorship only to phase them out in order to make way for their own products and services.
With time this economic policy concentrating only on liberalization, deregulation, and privatization — that is exclusively on things that attract capital — caused major social disillusionment and frustration and was less and less capable of mobilizing imagination and setting up new goals. Not to mention that there was something disturbing in the compliments for being a good student that the first post-regime change governments received from international financial organizations or Western governments.
This sort of attitude simply did not take account of the burdened legacy of communism or of the even deeper historical, economic, and social determining factors. In Hungary, in the first decade after regime change — except for a few marginal and feeble attempts — it was not even conceivable that there might be a different narrative other than the fast process doing away with the state and that in certain cases there is a clear need for a more decisive representation of our national interests.
They managed society or at least they tried but did not analyze it. This situation could best be described by the term cognitive dissonance: the country was not perceived in the framework of a world order but instead it was suggested that it was enough to follow European patterns and the country would prosper automatically.
This approach does not take note of the fact that European politics itself is also the scene of power games therefore it can be characterized by a lack of balance, uncertainty and a geographical market-based division of labour. However, the solution of one problem leads to another one but that one — just because it belongs to a different part of the machinery or because it is engrained in the future — it is overlooked by the machinery of jurisdiction.
What makes things worse, nothing can be reversed that has already been approved by the plan. Under such circumstances, with determining factors of foreign and domestic politics there was not even a chance to discuss, let alone, reach a consensus between right and left in issues of fundamental importance. These issues include: Can the state really be only a bad proprietor?
What consequences can the swift liberalization of strategic fields such as the energy sector have? This economic power dominance could be controlled by setting up institutions that keep a functioning free market capitalism in check and — where needed — establishing balance between the state and the market, which has been functioning well in most Western countries since the end of World War II or even earlier.
Hungarian society was in a sense chasing a mirage, a fata morgana, the well—known fixture of the Hungarian puszta. When the dream — so widely shared around the time of regime change in Hungary concerning a quick catch-up with the West by this Hungarians meant catching up with the standard of living of the Austrians with whom they used to live together in a common empire and who also functioned as an eternal reference point for Hungarians — dissipated, people switched to hope that the accession to the European Union would bring about this brave new world.
Then on 2 May Canaan still did not come and politicians did not do much to help a more realistic evaluation of the situation. It is enough to mention only one renowned item of the billboard campaign of the government about European accession which portrayed one of the privileges of EU membership by suggesting that the one-time Hungarian citizen could also open a coffee house in Vienna.
In reality, though, this ideal is much farther from the actual reality of Hungarians than the Hungarian capital is from the Austrian one. After joining the European Union we started to hope that having warmed up a little bit and learned the rules, we would finally be able to catch up with the so much desired object of our dreams — the West. Is it something epitomized by Germany, France, England, or Scandinavia? Unfortunately, the years of daydreaming were spent in the worst possible way.
Just to top off our woes, blinded by the glow of shop windows that we yearned for, we were busy not with the values that the European Union was founded and grew big on the establishment of clear relations, accumulation of wealth by way of hard work, selfdiscipline, moderation, investments and planning but above all we wanted to join the happy ranks of consumers.
Since we stretched ourselves more than our blankets would have allowed us to do we were forced to apply for loans. From the beginning of the year , the Hungarian state was taking out loans to finance investments and their operations, local governments were applying for credit, aimed at developments, and citizens also became indebted because of their pursuit of products of consumer society.
It all amounted to absurd political irresponsibility. This led to a situation when the socialist-liberal government, handing out portions of the budget in the hope of winning the elections of , worked up the budget deficit to 9. The end result came to be a lethal cocktail: large state debt and budget deficit, indebtedness of both local governments and citizens, which are outstanding even in a European comparison, coupled with weak growth.
So by now it is understandable why Hungary was the first country to resort to the IMF for help in the fall of , and why Budapest is known in the news primarily for the tools it tries to use in fighting state debt, budget deficit, and indebtedness.
During the five years since the outbreak of the economic crisis, the social— economic heap of problems came back to haunt us with overwhelming force. The economic hardships were amplified by the near pathological nature of the conflicts of Hungarian public life that was further worsened by the fundamentally differing assessments of the Hungarian past of the 20th century, a century bringing tragedies one after the other.
For some time, the right has been defining itself against the economic and intellectual mainstream as the preserver of values seemingly abandoned by the West, such as nation, work, family, faith, merit, effort, and enterprise. It would undoubtedly be beneficial for the economic performance of the country as well if this state of warlike preparedness subdued so that at the time of the 25th anniversary of regime change at least in a few key issues we would not need to conduct polemics in Hungary.
Born in He has been writing a diary since the age of In , he was awarded the Junior Prima prize in the media category. This article has been published in the third issue of Remembrance and Solidarity Studies dedicated to the consequences and commemorations of in Central Europe. The events in Poland were also followed by Polish political immigration to the West. Poles living in London or America, although deprived of direct contact with their country for a long time, still considered Polish issues a frame of reference in their public activities.
Having spent decades in exile, the emigrants had to face the changes taking place in their homeland and confront them with their own hopes and their ideological and political mission. The postwar reality was unacceptable for most of the civilian refugees and the soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, who found themselves in Western Europe at the close of World War II.
Their opposition to the Sovietization of Poland caused them to stay abroad and wait for changes in the international political situation. This laid the foundations of the postwar Polish diaspora in the s, which was decidedly anti-communist and pro-independence.
Since , the Polish Government and the President in exile had been based there, by invitation of the British authorities. Despite the Yalta agreement and the fact that the United States and United Kingdom withdrew their recognition in July and established diplomatic relations with the government in Warsaw, most Polish emigrants, including the Polish Armed Forces in the West, still under arms, recognized the authority and command of the London president and government. It survived for nearly half a century as such, with a president, government, and a quasi-parliament.
The foregoing guarantee was to be ensured by the office of President of the Republic of Poland and his Cabinet, who had the sole right and obligation to represent and act on behalf of the Polish state and nation. Apart from defining the status of the Polish Government in Exile, legalism had two meanings for the Polish emigrants.
The first pertained to the sphere of symbols and was crucial to the community which mainly founded its collective life on imponderables. In this sense, legalism was the basis for creating and cultivating a myth of the steadfast existence of the Polish State in Exile.
This myth manifested itself in rituals, special celebrations of national holidays and the way the President of the Republic of Poland was worshipped a word we use deliberately. The third function, apart from the political and legal role and mythmaking, was the integration of legalism.
The symbolic nature of the Polish state in exile involved the establishment of several competing political centers over a period of half a century. The presence of the president in exile in public life turned him into a symbol of the opposition against the Soviet dominion of Poland, and a natural political leader. This perception of the head of state prevented the Polish communities abroad from disintegrating entirely.
It should be explained here that this is by no means a condemnation. Apart from natural generation changes, the inner circle of the Polish communities abroad, for all the time they functioned as a political diaspora, was composed almost exclusively of people who had spent their adult years, or at least their adolescence, in prewar Poland. Subconsciously then, their perception of the contemporary state was shaped by the traditions of the Second Republic.
I was learning about a different Poland, one that was completely new to me. A country of his childhood My interlocutor was aware that Poland as he knew it no longer existed, and nothing could possibly bring it back to life. He still stood before a prewar map of Poland Michnik , Of course, the evocation of the past did not obscure the present for all emigrants. In his article Adam Michnik refers to the Parisian Kultura as an example of a Polish magazine published abroad that focused on dialogue with contemporary Poland.
Problems in communication were not entirely due to psychological differences or to the conflicting identities of the Warsaw Poles and the London Poles. The doctrine for which they left country in to fight for freedom, territorial integrity, and the independence of Poland.
It was still a maximalist approach. This was in the extreme idealization of their political problem: the Polish exile Icarus flew closer to the ideal, melting his wings which kept him in contact with reality Majewski , 16— Although there were groups and communities with pro-independence programs throughout the communist era, none of the irredentist movements — apart from the anti-communist armed resistance groups of s — in postwar Poland was on a mass scale.
Even the KPN [Confederation of Independent Poland], an organization of an openly pro-independent character established in the s, was perceived by many democratic opposition leaders as extreme and fundamentalist. To say nothing of the government in exile, functioning abroad for dozens of years, which rejected the Polish reality on principle.
Though they generally sympathized with the Polish workers who decided to rebel, the exile leaders surely realized that the road to independence would be very long. It should be emphasized that the emigrants, still true to their goals, remained exceptionally tactful with the Polish movement, refraining from imposing their point of view on Solidarity leaders. The mere existence of the underground Solidarity, often drawing from independence rhetoric and defying the political system in Poland, served to give meaning to their mission.
Some significance should also be attached to advances toward the exile circles made by a few opposition leaders, e. While not rejecting the idea of discussion with the communists on principle, they expressed two major reservations. The party will not adhere to any treaties. All arrangements are only a maneuver in a moment of weakness.
Secondly, a dialogue between the troubled ruling party and part of the democratic opposition risked the incorporation of this part of the democratic resistance into the apparatus of the current system, consequently delaying interminably the prospect of restoring genuine independence. This would have been a devastating blow to the ideas represented by the pro-independence expatriates. It is worth mentioning that this skepticism about the negotiations between the regime and the opposition was shared by the legalist circle in London and Kultura in Paris, who were traditionally more flexible and prone to dialogue.
The Round Table talks, which included government officials, some opposition members, and observers representing the Catholic Church, were held between 6 February and 5 April They did not discard the significance of the talks on principle, and some positive effects were mentioned, like the government concessions, but on the whole, a deep pessimism about the Round Table agreement dominated the statement.
It was pointed out, not without cause, that the right of the opposition to run for seats in the parliament was counterbalanced by reinstating the office of President, who was to be endowed with nearly dictatorial powers. The result of the parliamentary elections of 4 June, the second round was held on 18 June and the landslide victory of the Solidarity candidates, who took nearly one hundred per cent of the free seats in both chambers, is often considered a symbolic date in the history of Poland.
The symbolic significance of the date is not connected with the end of communism as such, but as the most important event in the whole process of political transformation of — Obviously, this point of view was unacceptable for the pro-independence expatriates, and for the legalist group in particular. This group had never hoped that the government in exile would one day return to Warsaw to rule the country.
Regulated, quasi-free elections, communist-controlled administration, military, and police forces bore no resemblance to democratic representation. The political elites focused on the elections as a sort of referendum. The results were to be seen as a mass disapproval of the current authority, expressed by the whole society. At the same time, the seats held in parliament by numerous significant representatives of the opposition could, as President Sabbat pointed out, result in the neutralization of Solidarity within the communist power apparatus.
One ominous harbinger of this direction was the election of General Wojciech Jaruzelski as President, which was announced as a stage in the execution of the Round Table agreement Dziennik Ustaw RP No. One of the most pessimistic evaluations of the situation in Poland was expressed by Prime-Minister-in-Exile Edward Szczepanik during the inaugural sitting of the seventh tenure of the National Council, held on 4 July, Turkowski , The symbolism of these two events could not possibly be more vivid, as the tragedy of an individual and a generation.
It might be said that the pessimistic attitude was giving way to expectations for more rapid political change in Poland Cichocka , The Congress referred to the situation in Poland and defined the position of the pro-independence emigration community against the backdrop of the current events in the country. In the final declaration it was emphasized that, despite the positive developments in Poland, the system remained communist and externally imposed. This clause echoed previously expressed fears that the reforms that had started only a few months before would come to a halt.
With reference to this issue, Prime Minister Edward Szczepanik stressed that conditio sine qua non was free parliamentary elections in Poland. According to Szczepanik, these could be held when the USSR abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine and all the political forces in Poland were given equal chance to run for parliament.
Interestingly enough, Szczepanik estimated it would take dissident underground groups a couple of years to emerge from hiding. This statement was much milder than an earlier address in the National Council, in which the issue of reestablishing the eastern borders was among the most inflexible demands Habielski , — Minister Skubiszewski had no intention of raising the question of the eastern border, and in he stated explicitly that Poland would lay no territorial claims against any of its neighbor states.
This official stance of the Polish minister caused some friction in London — the Government in Exile had never officially renounced the right to the Eastern Borderland, reserving this right for the parliament — but no immediate negative response was forthcoming Tarka , As a condition for ending the expatriate political mission, free parliamentary elections were also included in the National Council resolution of 2 December, February saw the restoration of the prewar coat of arms, a crowned white eagle.
In the first months of the remnants of the previous system swiftly disappeared. Changes in the name of the country and modifying its coat of arms could not be recognized as acts of this nature, since the office of President was held by the General, who had stood behind Martial Law.
Although the idea of restitutio ad integrum i. Jerzy Jan Zalewski, a minister in several governments in exile, admitted that demanding restitutio ad integrum , which he himself advocated, was wishful thinking on the part of the epigones of the Second Republic of Poland. It seems that most pro-independence emigration leaders were aware that this extreme understanding of legalism could only come about if the communist rule was overthrown, but not when a non-violent transformation was underway Zaleski , The only reasonable conclusion could be to end the fifty-year mission.
It was irrelevant to continue the activities of the authorities in exile with the process of democratization underway in Poland, and the Brezhnev doctrine, which had restrained Polish independence, practically invalid. To continue the mission when Poland was regaining the attributes of an independent state would pose the risk of being completely incomprehensible to Polish citizens both in Poland and abroad.
The only question was how to choose an appropriate moment to close the mission and make a symbolic return. In March , Prime-Minister-in-Exile Edward Szczepanik presented two possible scenarios for concluding the political mission in exile.
The other scenario was free parliamentary elections, based on the existing election statute and other regulations, a new constitution passed by both chambers, electing a President, and the President in Exile handing over the insignia of office. In early , however, the path to its implementation seemed rather long. One more important issue had to be addressed: official contacts with Polish authorities. After the government led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki was established, the situation became equivocal.
As such, during the first visit of the Polish Prime Minister to London from 26—27 February, , an official meeting between the authorities in exile and Tadeusz Mazowiecki was not held. But the political situation in the first half of presented no formal obstacles to strengthening relations. Under pressure from the right wing, General Jaruzelski decided to resign from office; this was confirmed by a resolution in the Sejm.
Thus, the expected order of elections was reversed: instead of parliamentary elections and a change of the constitution, a free presidential election was to be held first. Moreover, the presidential election was to be universal for the first time in Polish history. The Polish authorities in exile faced a historic decision about handing over the office of the President in Exile to the President of Poland to be elected in free, democratic elections, before they were held. The pivotal question was, as President Ryszard Kaczorowski rightly pointed out, whether a newly elected president would take the office from the successor to the prewar tradition of free Poland, or from the communist apparatchik, the man behind Martial Law of On 12 October, President Kaczorowski announced his intention to hand over his office to the President of Poland, chosen in a universal and democratic election Turkowski , 91— Having arranged the details for the transfer of the insignia of presidential power, Ryszard Kaczorowski arrived in Warsaw on 22 December, , on board a government plane, received with all the honors due to a head of state.
To them, above all, I pay my tribute today. It did not manage to reach all of its political goals. The political parties created in the free country shall take over its mission. Suchcitz , With his decision to accept the insignia of the office from Ryszard Kaczorowski, the President-elect confirmed that the Third Republic of Poland was the successor to prewar Poland.
I believe, however, that his general statement should be supplemented by a deeper reflection on the actual meaning of the symbolic transfer of the office from the head of the state-in-exile to the President of the nation. I can say without hesitation that on that day, at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, two Polands met. One, for fifty years on foreign soil, took pride in their tattered flags, and the other one, whose founding myth originated in recent events, in the rebellion of young Polish workers.
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